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A national strike called by the General Workers Confederation (Confederacion General del Trabajo,
CGT) for Nov. 9 attracted little support among the rank and file. Rather than push the government
into concessions, the strike apparently worsened internal divisions, leading to a formal split in
the CGT and the formation of a center-left union movement, the Congress of Argentine Workers
(Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA) on Nov. 14. The CGT called the 24-hour strike
in an effort to push for increases in minimum wages and monthly pensions for retired workers
(see Chronicle 11/05/92). On Nov. 10, Labor Minister Rodolfo Diaz labeled the movement a "total
failure," with official estimates placing union participation at 30% to 40% at best. On the other hand,
the CGT directorate claimed that 90% of its member organizations participated, but independent
accounts indicated that union estimates were greatly inflated. Labor support was concentrated
in the industrial areas of Buenos Aires and the cities of Rosario and Cordoba, but even there
press sources estimated 60% participation at most. Trains, subways and most bus service ground
to a halt after small groups of rioters burned six vehicles in Buenos Aires. State bank and other
government employees also offered scattered support, but nearly all schools, private banks and
commercial enterprises operated normally. A government threat to fire all striking civil servants
may have contributed to the poor turnout. Also, President Carlos Menem warned that "not one,
nor even a thousand strikes will force a change in the government's economic policies." But in
general, the failure of the strike reflected festering internal divisions within the CGT. Since the
Menem administration came to power in 1989, the CGT has been divided between government
supporters and those militantly opposition to official economic policies. The CGT directorate is
controled by members of the ruling Peronist party Partido Justicialista who have directly backed
President Menem in the 1989 elections. As a result, CGT leadership has continuously rejected calls
by the radical wing to protest the government's conservative austerity program. This has allowed
the Menem administration to pass broad anti-labor legislation, such as new legal prohibitions
on the right to strike in the public sector and a freeze on wage hikes unless accompanied by an
increase in worker productivity. Growing frustration among the opposition unions exploded in
October, when the more-radical leaders threatened to break away from the CGT until now the
country's only general labor confederation to form an independent union front. In response to
this pressure, the CGT directorate convoked the Nov. 9 action to calm internal dissent. In fact, in
particularly candid declarations on Nov. 6, CGT secretary general Oscar Lescano admitted the
strike was largely a "political" action aimed at staving off an "uncontrollable social explosion,
since the CGT's directorate is in danger of losing control over the base membership." He added,
"The general strike is not a protest against the Menem administration, but rather a rejection of the
government's economic model." Not surprisingly, the more militant unions refused to back the
strike. The 200,000-strong Education Workers Confederation (Confederacion de Trabajadores de
la Educacion, CTERA), for example, called on affiliates to boycott the Nov. 9 action. "The teachers
unions," said CTERA leader Mary Sanchez, "can't support a strike called by the same leaders who
raised their hands to approve the government's privatization program, as well as reductions in the
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state education budget." Moreover, in the wake of the strike, CGT leader Lescano's call to reopen
dialogue with the Menem administration despite the government's total intransigence aggravated
union infighting even more. "We are humble enough to support a reopening of dialogue in order
to change some aspects of the government's policies," said Lescano, "although we do not aim to
twist anybody's arm." Despite the CGT directorate's promise to carry out another 36-hour general
strike if the government did not cede to union demands in negotiations the radical member unions
finally split from the CGT altogether to form the CTA. Some 3,000 representatives from unions
around the country attended the CTA proclamation ceremony, including leaders from CTERA,
the State Workers Association (Asociacion de Trabajadores del Estado, ATE), metallurgic and tire
industry unions, railroad workers, naval and public works unions and the country's largest retiree
associations. The CTA also includes members of the communist party and dissidents of the ruling
Partido Justicialista. The provisional CTA directorate promised to promote broad labor action to
protest government policies, possibly foreshadowing a more militant period of union activity in the
coming months. (Sources: Agence France-Presse, 11/03/92, 11/06/92, 11/09/92, 11/10/92, 11/14/92;
Spanish news service EFE, 11/07/92-11/10/92, 11/14/92; Associated Press, 11/09/92)
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